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UNCOVERING THE COMMON RISK FREE RATE 





We introduce Longitudinal Factor Analysis (LFA) to extract the Common Risk Free 
(CRF) rate from a sample of sovereign bonds of countries in a monetary union. Since 
LFA exploits the typically very large longitudinal dimension of bond data, it performs 
better than traditional factor analysis methods that rely on the much smaller cross-
sectional dimension. European sovereign bond yields for the period 2006-2010 are 
decomposed into a CRF rate, a default risk premium, and a liquidity risk premium, 
shedding new light on issues such as benchmark status, flight-to-quality and flight-to-
liquidity hypotheses. Our empirical findings suggest that investors chase both credit 
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  21  Introduction 
The risk free interest rate is a corner-stone in the pricing of financial assets, risk 
measurement, and inter-temporal allocation models. For a monetary union, the risk free 
rate is not as easily observable as for countries with an individual currency. To address 
this point, this paper introduces a new technique to extract the common risk free rate 
from a sample of sovereign bonds. 
In general the risk free interest rate, or in short the risk free rate, is defined as 
the return that can be obtained by investing in (short-term) financial instruments with 
no default risk. For example, default on US treasury bills is theoretically impossible 
because the US government can repeal the Federal Reserve’s independence and have as 
much money printed as needed to honour its financial obligations. In contrast, in a 
monetary union with centralised monetary policy and decentralised tax collection, 
default-free instruments do not exist. 
In this paper the Common Risk Free (CRF) rate represents the return on a 
hypothetical common bond without default and liquidity risk. The CRF rate equals the 
minimum possible aggregate nominal funding costs of the union’s member states, and 
reflects the fundamentals of the union’s economy. Since we analyse long-term 
instruments, the CRF bond is however not free of inflation and market risk (i.e. the 
variability of short-term interest rates). The CRF rate includes the common part of the 
inflation risk premium across the members of the monetary union. Adjusting the bond 
yields for cross country differences in this premium is unnecessary because 
international investors are not affected by inflation outside their country of residence. 
Mayordomo et al. (2009) derive the CRF rate by using macro-economic 
variables such as the debt to GDP ratio to first estimate the country specific risk 
premiums. The CRF rate is then computed as the average of the countries’ bond yields 
adjusted for the corresponding risk premiums. We do the opposite by first estimating 
the CRF rate and then derive the risk premiums. Risk premiums in turn can be 
decomposed in a default risk premium and a liquidity risk premium.
1 None of the three 
bond yield components are directly observable, as even the sovereign Credit Default 
Swap (CDS) rate cannot be taken as a direct measure of the corresponding bond credit 
                                                 
1 Liquidity risk arises from uncertainty about deadweight losses when a security is sold before its 
expiration date. 
  3risk premium, as suggested by Mayordomo et al. (2009), since it also contains its own 
liquidity risk component. 
We attribute the first common factor in the CDS-adjusted sovereign bond yields 
to the CRF rate. Note that the deviations of the CDS-adjusted bond yields from the 
CRF rate consist of differences between, on the one hand, implied credit and liquidity 
risk premiums on the bond, and, on the other hand, implied credit and liquidity risk 
premiums on the CDS. Common factors in these differences across countries are 
assumed to be less important than the CRF rate for the variation in the bond yields. This 
holds when both the difference in the implied price of credit risk and the difference in 
liquidity risk premiums between the bond and the CDS are small relative to the CRF 
rate. As shown below, usually such a situation occurs. 
A new method for factor analysis is introduced to extract this unobserved 
common component. Like with classical factor analysis (see Jöreskog, 1969) our 
method finds the common component up to an additive and multiplicative scaling 
factor. However, these scaling factors can be derived under weak assumptions. One 
assumption is the existence of a benchmark security. Benchmark securities are used for 
price discovery of market-wide phenomena (see Hasbrouck, 1996). In the absence of 
benchmark bond specific news (such as a deterioration of credit quality) investors 
attribute price changes of the benchmark bond fully to the risk free rate. The sensitivity 
of the benchmark bond to the CRF rate thus equals unity. This does not necessarily 
imply that all risks inherent in the benchmark security are systematic as suggested by 
Yuan (2005) and Dunne et al. (2007). In our model, only variability in the risk free rate 
leads to systematic risk. Although the benchmark bond may carry a time-varying risk 
premium, by assuming that the benchmark bond tracks the risk free rate, the 
multiplicative factor for the re-scaling of the common component follows from the 
factor loading associated with the benchmark bond. The additive factor follows by 
leaving no unexplained fixed components in the deviations of the CDS-adjusted bond 
yields from the CRF rate, once, these deviations, in turn, are corrected for differences in 
bond and CDS liquidity risk. Here we assume that the liquidity risk premium, i.e. the 
price of possible future transaction costs, is positively and linearly related to current 
transaction costs. In principle, risk premiums could be negative due to preferential tax 
treatment even when economic agents are risk averse. Landon (2009) however finds 
that since 1994 taxes have not been capitalised in Canadian government bond yields, 
  4suggesting that the marginal investor is best represented by a non-taxed entity. 
Accordingly, in this paper we ignore the possible effects of taxes. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1991) confirm the pricing of a liquidity effect in US treasury notes and 
bills. 
In order to improve the efficiency of factor analysis we derive cross-variable 
restrictions, and maximize the likelihood function under these restrictions. Classical 
factor analysis ignores these restrictions. Since our method, hereafter called 
Longitudinal Factor Analysis (LFA), exploits the typically very large longitudinal 
dimension of bond data, it performs better than traditional factor analysis methods that 
rely on the much smaller cross-sectional dimension. The results of a Monte Carlo 
experiment show that LFA is more efficient in the estimation of idiosyncratic risk and 
the common component than Principal Components (PC) based on Theil’s (1971) 
method and classical factor analysis based on the EM algorithm of Rubin and Thayer 
(1982). Both PC and EM substantially overestimate the idiosyncratic risk on relatively 
low risk bonds, while conversely the risk on high risk bonds is systematically 
underestimated. The deviations are up to 73% and 27% of the true risk for the PC and 
EM methods respectively. In contrast, LFA only slightly overestimates the 
idiosyncratic risk of all bonds with less than 0.4% of the true risk. So far, the use of our 
estimation technique is limited to models with one common factor only. 
Bond and CDS data for the European Monetary Union (EMU) are used to 
derive the 5- and 10-year CRF rate in the euro area during the years 2006 till 2010. In 
addition to eleven sovereign issuers we also include bonds of the European Investment 
Bank (EIB). Since the EIB is owned by the member states of the European Union, all 
EMU countries are liable for these bonds. EIB bonds are however different from a 
common EMU bond since the liability of EIB owners is limited to their amount of 
subscribed capital, which is below the debt outstanding, and some countries outside the 
EMU are also liable for EIB bonds.  
Finance professionals generally consider the German Bund as the benchmark 
for the euro-denominated sovereign bond market. Based on arguments related to price 
discovery, academics have suggested other possible definitions of benchmark status 
such as the asset with the lowest idiosyncratic risk (see Dunne, Moore and Portes 
(2007), henceforth referred to as DMP, for evidence on EMU sovereign benchmarks). 
  5Our base-case uses the Bund as the a priori benchmark. Robustness checks are made by 
using alternatively one of the other countries’ bonds as a priori benchmark.  
Analyzing French, German and Italian bonds, DMP designate, with the 
exception of very long-term bonds, French bonds as sovereign benchmarks for the 
period April 2003 – March 2005 because bi-lateral inter-bond regressions with French 
bonds have lowest residual variances. Our empirical results are in accordance with this 
finding for the pre-crisis period up to June 2007 included, but not thereafter. Moreover, 
before the crisis, there are other bonds, such as Dutch 5-year bonds that are even less 
risky than French 5-year bonds. Since the sub-prime mortgage crisis, however, Bunds 
have the lowest risk. The lowest variance in the total risk premium is observed for the a 
priori benchmark only if the Bund is chosen as the benchmark. For all other choices of 
benchmark, the Bund remains the bond with the lowest idiosyncratic risk. Hence, the 
data confirm its benchmark status. 
Our method for determining which bond has the lowest idiosyncratic risk has 
two important advantages over the one proposed by DMP. First, it can be applied for 
any number of assets whereas the DMP method cannot handle more than three. 
Secondly, in Section 3 we show that the inter-bond regressions cannot be run 
independently since the errors are not independent across equations. Our method solves 
this problem by maximising the likelihood function with the errors of the structural 
equations only.  
Our main other empirical findings are as follows: 1) from the moment the 
financial crisis hit the sovereign bond markets, the German Bund does not correspond 
closely to the common risk free rate any longer. Investors have begun to demand a 
significant risk premium even on benchmark securities. 2) The increase in credit risk 
premiums is by far the dominant factor in the divergence of the euro area sovereign 
bond yields. The increase in the liquidity risk premiums is relatively small and only 
plays a minor role for all bonds. 3) Since the crisis, bonds with higher credit risk also 
tend to have higher liquidity risk. Furthermore, liquidity risk and credit risk are 
positively correlated over time, meaning that liquidity is more valued during episodes 
of higher aggregate risk. 4) Sovereign credit risk priced in euro area bonds tend to be 
higher than that priced into credit default swaps, suggesting that the derivative markets 
are not driving up bond yields. In the main text we compare these results to the findings 
of recent other studies.  
  6The remainder of this paper is organised in four parts: Section 2 explains how 
the common risk free rate in a monetary union can be uncovered by exploiting the 
commonalities in bond yields of different sovereigns. Section 3 discusses the new 
statistical method to find this common factor. Section 4 decomposes the sovereign bond 
yields in the European Monetary Union in the common risk free rate, the default risk 
premium and the liquidity risk premium, and analyses how these components have 
behaved during the recent crisis. Section 5 concludes. 
2  A parsimonious model for the common risk free rate in a monetary union 
Let   be the sovereign bond yield of member country   of the monetary union at time 
t for a particular maturity.  can be decomposed in a risk free component ( ) 
common to all n countries in the union, and a country specific risk premium (
it y i
it y t R
it  ): 
it t it R y    ,         ( 1 )     , ,    t N i
where   and  The two components of the risk premium (  and 
) compensate the investor for default and liquidity risk: 
} ,..., 1 { n N 
it ,
}. ,..., 1 { T   it D
BOND L
it BOND it it L D ,    .         ( 2 )  
None of the three bond yield components are directly observable. However, investors 
observe the cost of insurance against default of sovereign   on the corresponding Credit 
Default Swap (CDS): 
i
it CDS it it L D CDS ,   ,         ( 3 )  
where   is the liquidity risk premium on the CDS.  it CDS L ,
The CRF rate can be uncovered by extracting the first common factor in the 
difference between the bond yield and the CDS rate.
2 In particular, a common 
component ( ) with a mean and variance equal to zero and unity, respectively, can be 
extracted from the CDS-adjusted bond yields by factor analysis (see Jöreskog, 1969) of 
the model: 
t Z
, it t i i it it it e Z b a CDS y x            ( 4 )  
                                                 
2 The first factor explains more of the variation in the CDS-adjusted bond yields than any other common 
factor. 
  7where   is a country specific fixed effect and   is the factor loading for country i. 
The disturbances   are assumed to be independently drawn from a normal distribution 
with zero mean and variance  . Rotation of   gives the CRF rate: 
i a i b
it e
2
i s t Z
, t t Z R              ( 5 )  
where    and   are unknown parameters. We allow the risk premiums  it   to be 
dependent on the CRF rate  , so that factor loadings can differ across bonds. Note that 
the liquidity and credit risk premiums may also exhibit significant other common 
factors that possibly are even more important than the CRF rate for the variation in the 
risk premiums. However, common factors, if there are any, in the difference in the 
liquidity risk premium between the bond and the corresponding CDS, are assumed to 
be less important than the CRF rate for the variation in the bond yields. 
t R
In order to fix the multiplicative scaling factor  we assume that one of the 
bonds in N is a benchmark bond (B). Benchmark bonds are used to discover market-
wide phenomena. In the absence of benchmark bond specific news (such as a 
deterioration of credit quality) investors attribute price changes of the benchmark bond 
fully to the risk free rate, implying that the sensitivity of the benchmark bond to the 
CRF rate equals unity, that is: 
. B b            ( 6 )  
The risk premium is orthogonal to the CRF rate for bonds with factor loadings as in the 
right-hand side of Equation (6). 
The additive scaling factor   follows by leaving no unexplained fixed 
components in the deviations of the CDS-adjusted bond yields from the CRF rate, once, 
these deviations, in turn, are corrected for differences in bond and CDS liquidity risk. 
To do so, we need some information about liquidity risk. There is no direct information 
available on future transaction costs. Current transaction costs (  and  ) 
however can be observed. It is reasonable to expect that investors take into account the 
current transaction cost on the bond and the CDS when pricing possible future 
transaction cost. For example, in the euro area, the transaction cost on sovereign CDS 
has been systematically above the transaction cost on sovereign bonds. Investors are 
then likely to demand a higher liquidity risk premium on the CDS than on the bond. We 
it BOND T , it CDS T ,
  8exploit this information by assuming that the liquidity risk premium is positively and 
linearly related to current transaction cost, 
 it BOND it BOND T L , ,   and   it CDS it CDS T L , ,  ,     (7) 
where   is an unknown parameter. We assume that the liquidity risk premiums for the 
bond and the CDS depend in the same way on the respective transaction costs as there 
are no obvious arguments for the opposite. Both   and   can now be estimated by 
ordinary regression of the model: 
it it CDS it BOND t B it T T Z b x         ) ( ˆ
, , ,     (8) 
where   is the derived common component and  t Z ˆ
it   is an error term. Finally, the credit 
risk premium immediately follows once the CRF rate and liquidity risk premium are 
known. 
3  Improving the efficiency of factor analysis for one-factor models 
A new technique is proposed for the factor analysis of equation (4), which is explained 
in detail in this section. Throughout we assume that the only available information 
about the exogenous process stems from the CDS-adjusted bond yields. We derive 
cross-variable restrictions, and maximize the likelihood function under these 
restrictions. Classical factor analysis (see Jöreskog’s, 1969) ignores these restrictions, 
leading to parameter estimates that are possibly infeasible because of their implications 
(i.e. negative variances). Since our method (called Longitudinal Factor Analysis) 
exploits the typically very large longitudinal dimension of bond data, it performs better 
than traditional factor analysis methods that rely on the much smaller cross-sectional 
dimension. The core of the estimation method is to regress bonds on each other. The 
original model parameters can then be extracted from the estimation results of these 
inter-bond regressions. For three bonds the model parameters are uniquely pinned 
down, so the discussion of the method starts with this special case. 
3.1  Estimating with three bonds 
We can remove the dependency of bond i on the exogenous factor by regressing on a 
different bond j. Using the definition of xit and xjt from Equation (4) we can write this 










































a     .       ( 9 )  
As Zt drops out from the equation, at this point no assumption needs to be made about 
its distribution. Equation (9) shows that regressing bond i on bond j yields constant ai – 
(bi/bj)aj and coefficient bi/bj. Note that alternatively we could have regressed bond j on 
bond i. This would have led to xjt = aj – (bj/bi)ai + (bj/bi)xit + ejt - (bj/bi)eit, which is 
identical to Equation (9) scaled by bj/bi. Hence, all information can be obtained from 
either of these regressions. 
Equation (9) further shows that  , the variance of the disturbances when 





















.         ( 1 0 )  
Although   is known since it is the coefficient of the inter-bond regression,   and 
 are not pinned down since we have only one equation and two unknowns. Two 
bonds are thus not sufficient to extract the parameters of the original model. 





However, now consider the case where we have three bonds. Let i, j, k denote 
different bonds and regress bond i on bond j, i on k and j on k. The variances of the 
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  10The variances of the bonds can now be obtained after first computing the errors of the 
inter-bond regressions according to Equation (9) and then applying System (12) with 
the resulting variances. 
Equation (9) shows that the errors of the three inter-bond regressions are not 
independent. Similarly, when the ratios bi/bj and bi/bk are known, the ratio bj/bk follows. 
Hence, we cannot perform these regressions independently. Instead, we obtain 
estimates of the constants and factor loadings by maximizing the likelihood of the 
errors in Equation (4). In this way, we can exploit that the errors eit, ejt and ekt are 
independent by assumption. Standard maximum likelihood procedures can be used. 
Since we assume that all our information about the exogenous process stems from the 
bonds, we do not want to impose a particular distribution on Zt. We thus treat the 
exogenous factor as having an improper uniform density function, which is constant on 
the real line and thus uninformative. The infinite mass does not cause problems when 
conditioning on Zt (see Hartigan, 1983). Up to the constant density of Zt, the likelihood 
of observing the errors is thus:  

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Under the restrictions of System (12), Equation (13) is maximized over the constants a 
(i.e. ai, aj and ak) and factor loadings b (i.e. bi, bj and bk).
3 
Restrictions on the exogenous process are needed to obtain the individual factor 
loadings and constants. We can think of the factor loadings as measuring how sensitive 
the bonds are to the volatility of the underlying factor. For given factor loadings, the 
constants a pin down the level of the bonds. Since both the level of the exogenous 
process and its variability are unknown, there are two degrees of freedom and we thus 
need two restrictions.
4 To emphasize, given the bond yields, restrictions on the level 
and volatility of the exogenous process affect a and b, and vice versa. We assume that 
the level and variability of the exogenous process are equal to 0 and 1 respectively. 
                                                 
3 For practical purposes the computation of the T integrals is not convenient. By recognizing from the 
integrand that Zt conditioned on xit, xjt and xkt has a normal density, each integral can be replaced. See 
Appendix I for the details. 
4 Standardizing only the level of the exogenous process to C is not sufficient. To see this, note that if the 
level of a particular exogenous process Z satisfies this condition, so does the process uZ + (1 – u)C. 
Hence, the standardization does not only need to fix the level of the exogenous process, but also its 
variability. 
  11To make the standardization of Z  operational, we need expressions for the 
expectation and variability of the exogenous process. The maximum likelihood estimate 
of the exogenous process Z ˆ  is derived in Appendix I. Although we assume the most 
uninformative distribution of the exogenous factor, conditional on the three bonds it has 


























































 ,      ( 1 4 )  
which is an unbiased estimate of Zt with estimation variance  + 
. Note that the individual bonds are first centered by a and scaled by b since 
(xit – ai)/bi is the best estimate of the underlying process conditional on xit (see Equation 
(4)). Then a weighted average is taken over the three scaled bonds with the relative 
weights being the squared factor loadings over the variances. Hence, relative weights 
are high if bonds have a low idiosyncratic risk compared to their dependence on the 
exogenous factor. Intuitively, these bonds are good predictors of the exogenous factor. 
In fact, the weights   are the inverse of the variance of the predictions (xit – 
ai)/bi.  is the best linear unbiased estimate of Zt.  
2 2 2 2 2
ˆ / / ( j j i i Z s b s b s  
1 2 2 ) /

k k s b
t Z ˆ
2 2 / i i s b
While it is too complicated to obtain a full analytical solution of the 
maximization problem, our standardization makes it possible to find analytical 
expressions for the estimator   of the constants. In Appendix I it is shown that the 
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When now taking time-averages of both sides of Equation (14) and using the above 
equalities, we find the following unbiased estimate for the level of the exogenous 
process: 
  12
































































ˆ . (16) 
When the level of the exogenous process is standardized to 0, this equation is not 
dependent on bi  anymore  and it directly follows that   it t i x E a  ˆ . Similarly, 
  jt t j x E a  ˆ  and   kt t k x E a  ˆ . 
To obtain estimates b for the factor loadings, we need to standardize the 
variability of the exogenous process. The variance of the estimate of Zt (V[ ]) equals 
the sum of the variance of (V[ ]) and the variance of the estimation error ( ). 







































































































s Z V Z V . (17) 
When the ratios   and   and the variances of the disturbances are known, 
imposing the variance of the exogenous process to be 1 pins down   and hence the 
estimates for the other factor loadings. Thus, we can maximize Equation (13) over two 
ratios of factor loadings, say bi/bj and bi/bk, since the constants are known, and the 
individual factor loadings follow from the standardization of Equation (17). 
j i b b / k i b b /
i b ˆ
3.2  Estimating with more than three bonds 
In case of n bonds there are n(n – 1)/2 possible pairs for inter-bond regressions and n 
variances to be found. The analogue of System (12) will be a system of n(n – 1)/2 
equations in n unknowns. For n > 3 there will be more equations than unknowns. 
Although in theory (i.e. asymptotically) solving any n equations that pin down all 
unknowns would yield variances that solve the other equations as well, for finite 
samples this will not be the case. Hence, some cross-variable restrictions would 
possibly be violated and there is no obvious way to decide which restrictions can be 
ignored. 
We circumvent this problem by exploiting the fact that for three bonds all cross-
variable restrictions can be imposed and apply the method therefore to each possible set 
  13of three bonds. For n bonds, we have n(n – 1)(n – 2)/6 of these sets. Each of these sets 
provides an estimate for the parameters of the included bonds. Let Hi contain all (n – 
1)(n – 2)/2 sets of three bonds that include bond i. It follows that for each bond there 
are (n – 1)(n – 2)/2 estimates for the corresponding factor loading and error variance. 
Although some of the cross-variable restrictions may still be violated, perhaps the most 
efficient way to obtain the system parameters is to compute the average of the 
respective estimates over all possible sets of three bonds. Note that this is only possible 
because the standardization of the external process leads to similarly scaled factor 
loadings. 
By following this strategy the main steps of LFA can be summarized as follows. 
3.3  Summary of LFA  
1)  For each set  i H h of three bonds including bond i the likelihood function in 
Equation (13) is maximized over  j i b b /  and  k i b b /  (using the representation of 
Equation (21) in Appendix I) under the restrictions of System (12).  










1 ˆ  
3)  An intermediate estimate ( h i b , ˆ ) of the factor loading  i b  for each set  i H h  is 
obtained from Equation (17) with the standardization V[Zt] = 1. 
4)  An intermediate estimate (
2
, ˆ h i s ) of the error variance 
2
i s  for each set  i H h  is 
obtained from System (12) after computing the error variances 
2 2, ik ij s s  and 
2
jk s  
of the inter-bond regressions. 
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2 ˆ . 
6)  The final estimate of the external process Z is obtained by extending Equation 
(14) to include all bonds. 
3.4  A Monte Carlo experiment 
To asses the performance of LFA we have run simulations to compare the results under 
our method with those obtained by Principal Components (PC) based on Theil’s (1971) 
method and factor-analysis based on the EM algorithm of Rubin and Thayer (1982). In 
line with the empirical Section 4 on the CRF rate for the euro area the experiment 
considers twelve bonds with different sensitivities to the common factor and risks. 
Bond yield series of one thousand observations each are generated according to 
Equation (4) without constant and with factor loadings equal to  ,  10 / ) 1 ( 1    i bi
  14}. 12 ,..., 1 {  i  The disturbances corresponding to bond   are drawn from a normal 
distribution with zero mean and variance equal to  ,   
The common component   is drawn from a standard normal distribution. To be 
consistent with the model in Section 2, idiosyncratic risk is measured by  . Under 
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Average estimates are computed over ten-thousand replications. Table 7 of 
Appendix II reports the average factor loadings and average variances of the errors. 
Figure 1a shows the average error in the factor loading (E[ ]/ -1) whereas Figure 1b 
shows the average error in the idiosyncratic risk (E[
2 2 ˆ ˆ i i b s ) / (
2 2
i i b s ]/ -1) of bond i. 
Figure 1c shows the average absolute error in the estimated common component, which 














 t Z .  
LFA is better in predicting the factor loading and idiosyncratic risk of most 
bonds. Both PC and EM underestimate (overestimate) the factor loading of relatively 
low (high) risk bonds up to 4% and 0.6% of the true value respectively. LFA 
underestimates the factor loading of all bonds up to only 0.1% of the true value (see 
Figure 1a). For some bonds the estimation error in the factor loading is 82% lower for 
LFA than for EM, and the efficiency gain is even larger when LFA is compared to PC. 
Moreover, PC and EM substantially overestimate (underestimate) the idiosyncratic risk 
on relatively low (high) risk bonds. The deviation is up to 73% and 27% of the true risk 
for the two respective methods. In sharp contrast, LFA overestimates the idiosyncratic 
risk of all bonds only up to 0.4% of the true risk (see Figure 1b). LFA is superior to PC 
in the estimation of the idiosyncratic risk of all bonds. EM has a slightly smaller 
estimation error than LFA in the idiosyncratic risk of bond i=5. However, in all other 
cases LFA is superior to EM in the estimation of the idiosyncratic risk. Clearly, 
exploiting the longitudinal dimension of the sample indeed leads to overall better 
estimates of the idiosyncratic risk. 
LFA is also better in predicting the common component. The estimation error in 
 is on average 34% smaller for LFA than PC and 2% smaller for LFA than EM (see 
Figure 1c). Although the latter gain is modest, one should keep in mind that the factor 
t Z
  15loading of the benchmark bond is needed to compute the CRF rate. The efficiency gain 
from using LFA instead of EM when estimating the CRF rate thus comes first and 
foremost from an improvement in the estimation of the factor loadings.  
In sum, LFA clearly outperforms PC and classical factor analysis when the 
cross-sectional dimension of the panel data set is small and the longitudinal dimension 
is large. Note, however, that so far our estimation technique is limited to models with 
one common factor only.
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5 In the case of two common factors, at least four bonds are needed to identify the system parameters. 
Using four bonds yields a system of four variance equations (restrictions) in four unknowns. However, 
the system has rank three and does not have a unique solution. 




























Note: See the notes of Appendix II for details of the simulation.  
 
  174  The common risk free rate in the European Monetary Union 
4.1  The data 
We analyze bonds of eleven countries that are part of the European Monetary Union: 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain, and bonds of the European Investment Bank (EIB).
6 The period 
under analysis is Feb. 2006 till Feb. 2010. Using individual plain-vanilla bond quotes 
on Bloomberg, 5-year and 10-year spot yields are constructed for each country (see 
Appendix III).
7 One caveat is worth mentioning upfront. In normal times bond quotes 
are close to transaction prices. However, in times of financial market stress there can be 
important discrepancies.  
Where available, the on-the-run bond (i.e. the most recent issue in the reference 
maturity) is used when inter- or extrapolating points on the yield curve. Blanco (2001) 
finds that on-the-run French, German and Spanish sovereign bonds have significantly 
lower yields than off-the-run bonds. For example, between January 1999 and May 
2001, the yield on on-the-run German bonds was about six b.p. lower than on off-the-
run bonds. On-the-run bonds are thus closer to the risk free rate, and therefore of 
particular interest for this study. Ejsing and Sihvonen (2009) find that, between January 
2006 and September 2008, on-the-run status has only a modest effect on the pricing of 
German sovereign bonds when other factors have not been controlled for. On-the-run 
status however is found to have a significant positive impact on liquidity, even after 
controlling for substantial spillover effects from Bund future contracts to cash bonds, 
which in turn has a negative impact on the yield.
8 In contrast with our bond selection 
strategy, Gürkaynak et al. (2006) exclude on-the-run bonds and their deputies (i.e. the 
second most recently issued bond) when estimating the US treasury yield curve so that 
the liquidity of the included securities is relatively uniform. In addition to liquidity 
effects, Pasquariello and Vega (2007) find also other factors, such as bond maturity, 
that can explain yield differences between on-the-run and off-the-run US treasury 
bonds. Exclusion of on-the-run bonds could thus bias the estimate of the risk free rate. 
                                                 
6 Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta are excluded due to their size; members of EMU that only recently 
joined such as Slovenia and Slovakia are excluded to have a longer time-span for the older members. 
7 Bloomberg reports z-spreads only since Feb. 2006. 
8 Table 3, 4 and 5 of Ejsing and Sihvonen (2009) show that on-the-run status increases the trading 
volumes and quoted depth (i.e. volume available for trading at the best three bid and offer prices) and 
lowers the bid-ask spread, respectively. Table 9 shows that liquidity, when measured by the bid-ask 
spread, can explain part of the differences between French and German bond yields. 
  18Other bond selection criteria are discussed in Appendix III. For instance, French, 
German and Italian bonds are required to have a minimum size of € 1bn, for all other 
countries and the EIB € 500mn is the minimum size. The number of outstanding bonds 
and corresponding face value are substantially higher for France, Germany, and Italy in 
comparison to the other countries (see Table 1). Between Feb. 2006 and Feb. 2010, the 
bonds of these three countries together covered almost half the number of total bonds 
and two-thirds of the total amount outstanding on bonds with an original maturity of 
more than four years. The total size of the sovereign plain-vanilla long-term (large-
sized) bond market was about € 3.5tr (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: The size of the long-term sovereign bond market in the euro area between 
Feb. 2006 and Feb. 2010 
  Average number   Average amount outstanding (in € million) 
Austria 17  134 
Belgium 20  225 
Finland 9  46 
France 43  729 
Germany 42  750 
Greece 22  168 
Ireland 10  52 
Italy 38  722 
Netherlands 18  187 
Portugal 15  83 
Spain 23  271 
EIB 18  81 
Total 274  3448 
Note: Only large fixed rate plain vanilla bonds with an original maturity of more than four years are 
included. 
 
Table 8 of Appendix IV provides statistics about the bonds used in the 
estimation of the spot yields by reference maturity. The number of bonds used varies 
from five in the case of 5-year Irish bonds to twenty in the case of 5-year German 
bonds. All countries and the EIB have issued at least one on–the-run bond in both the 5-
year and 10-year reference maturity during or just before the sample period since the 
minimum original maturity of the bonds used is within the reference maturity interval 
(see Appendix III for a definition). The maximum original maturity is in all cases at 
least five years above the reference maturity. For example, the maximum original 
maturity of Austrian bonds that are potentially used to estimate the 10-year CRF is 15.5 
years, i.e. 5.5 years higher than the reference maturity. Note that the remaining time to 
maturity of these bonds is usually close to the reference maturity on the dates when 
  19they are used for interpolation. Except for 5-year EIB bonds, the minimum size of the 
bonds used to calculate the spot yields is substantially higher than the minimum size 
selection criterion mentioned above. On average, used bonds have a face value of at 
least € 5 bn. 
The 5-year and 10-year bond spot yields are shown in Figure 2a and 2b 
respectively. Two things are worth pointing out. 1) until spring 2007 the lowest yields 
are found on Finnish, German and Irish bonds. Throughout the sample period the 
highest yields are usually found on Greek bonds except for an intermediate period 
between May 2008 and October 2009 when Irish bonds earn the highest yields. As a 
result of the financial crisis, Irish bonds thus went from the most expensive to the 
cheapest bonds in the euro area. 2) while yields were moving nearly synchronously 
until the first half of 2007, the cross-country variance in bond yields increased 
massively during the financial crisis. The difference between minimum and maximum 
yields rose from about 30 b.p. in 2006 to more than 400 b.p. in 2010. Basic descriptive 
statistics of the bond spot rates are shown in Table 9 of Appendix IV. 
 
















































































































































Data on sovereign and EIB Credit Default Swap (CDS) quotes are from Credit 
Market Analysis Limited and Markit respectively (see Table 10 of Appendix IV for 
  20descriptive statistics). The EIB CDS data must be cautiously interpreted as the reported 
quotes may not necessarily reflect true trading opportunities. To the best of the authors’ 
knowledge, so far EIB CDS have actually never been traded. 
 Figure 3 shows the CDS spread evolution over the sample period by reference 
maturity. There are again two points worth mentioning. 1) before the crisis the lowest 
CDS spreads are observed for Austria, France and the Netherlands. Recall that during 
this period Finish, German and Irish bonds earned the lowest yields. Note however that 
there are no pre-crisis data on Finnish CDS spreads available. Since the crisis, CDS 
spreads are among the lowest for Finland, Germany, and the EIB. The cost of insurance 
against a default of the EIB is only marginally higher, or sometimes even below, the 
insurance cost on Finnish or German debt. The CDS spreads are the highest for Ireland, 
Italy and Greece. 2) by comparing the CDS spreads in Figure 3 with the bond yields in 
Figure 2 we observe that until the second half of 2007 changes in bond spot yields were 
not driven by changes in CDS spreads. Indeed, between Feb. 2006 and Aug. 2007, bond 
spot yields rose by more than 100 b.p. while CDS spreads were basically flat. In 
contrast, since the summer of 2007, a large part of the variation in bond yields is caused 
by swings in the credit risk premiums. In the next two sections we will determine what 
role the CRF rate and liquidity premiums have played. 
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We measure transaction cost by the respective bid-ask spread on the bond and 
the CDS. The difference between the bid and the ask rate is the most important cost 
incurred by the investor when buying and subsequently selling a security. Table 11 of 
Appendix IV shows the average transaction cost by reference maturity and sub-sample 
period. The sample is broken up in a pre-crisis period from Feb. 2006 until Jun. 2007 
included, and a financial crisis period from July 2007 until the end of our sample, i.e. 
Feb. 2010. Although sovereign bond markets were initially little affected, the beginning 
of the financial crisis is thus associated with the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US. 
The main features of the transaction cost data are as follows. First, in all cases, the 
transaction cost on the CDS is higher than on the corresponding bond. Before the 
outbreak of the recent financial crisis, the 5-year bond transaction cost was on average 
about 0.6 b.p. whereas the five-year CDS transaction costs was on average about 1.6 
b.p.. For 10-year bonds and CDS, the average transaction cost was 0.4 b.p. and 2.6 b.p. 
respectively. Note that the 10-year bond transaction cost is lower than the 5-year bond 
transaction cost whereas the 10-year CDS transaction cost is higher than the 5-year 
CDS transaction cost. Hence, the impact of maturity on trading cost is ambiguous. 
Secondly, in almost all cases, the CDS transaction cost increased more than the bond 
  22transaction cost during the financial crisis. France, Italy and Portugal are exceptions as 
for these countries the transaction cost on 10-year CDS increased less fast than the 
transaction cost on the corresponding bond. Thirdly, the pre-crisis data do not reveal a 
clear cross-sectional relationship between the bond and the CDS transaction cost. Since 
the crisis, however, bonds of countries with relatively low bond transaction cost also 
tend to have relatively low CDS transaction cost, as shown by the scatter plots in Figure 
4 for eleven out of the twelve issuers. Unfortunately, CDS transaction costs are not 
available for the EIB.  
 
Fig. 4a: Average 5-year bond against 
CDS transaction cost (in b.p.) 
Fig. 4b: Average 10-year bond against 





















































Note: The transaction cost is measured by the difference in the bid and the ask rate. The average value is 
computed over the financial crisis period Jul. 2007 – Feb. 2010. 
 
The data description points out several issues that seem important for the 
estimation procedure. Figure 3 raises the question whether the factor loadings in 
Equation (4) could be unstable because of a regime shift in the importance of the credit 
risk premiums. Furthermore, pre-crisis Irish bonds seem to be clear outliers since their 
low bond yields seem inconsistent with their high transaction costs. Last but not least, 
the transaction cost data suggest that, under the assumptions of the model in Section 2, 
the CDS-adjusted bond yields should be on average lower than the CRF rate because 
the right-hand side explanatory variable of Equation (8), i.e. the difference in the 
transaction cost between the bond and the CDS, is on average negative. Preliminary 
analysis of the data however reveals that for some countries the CDS-adjusted bond 
  23yields were on average above the CRF rate, suggesting that the credit risk premium 
implied on the CDS can differ from the one on the bond. 
4.2  The Common Risk Free rate 
Taking into account the results of the data inspection, the following strategy is applied 
when estimating the common risk free rate: 
1)  Over the pre-crisis (Feb. 2006 – Jun. 2007) period, factor loadings are assumed 
to be stable, and factor analysis of Equation (4) is performed on a sample of nine out of 
the twelve issuers. Finnish and EIB bonds are excluded from the factor analysis 
because there is no or insufficient information available on the CDS spreads during this 
period; Irish bonds are excluded because they create outlying observations. Irish and 
EIB factor loadings are estimated in a second step by OLS regression of their CDS-
adjusted bond yields on the common component   of Equation (4) obtained in the first 
step (and a constant). In this way, Irish and EIB bonds do not affect the CRF rate, but 
their factor loadings can still be obtained. Note that factor analysis requires a balanced 
sample and that missing observations lead to 5-year and 10-year samples with a 
different number of observations. By including the EIB in the factor analysis the 
number of observations T would be substantially reduced. 
t Z ˆ
2)  Over the financial crisis period (Jul. 2007 – Feb. 2010), factor loadings are 
allowed to vary, and are estimated over rolling windows of 125 trading days. One 
window corresponds to half a calendar year. The CRF rate over the rolling windows is 
based on factor analysis of Equation (4) on a sample of only four issuers. We only 
include Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands because for some windows the 
factor loadings of the other eight issuers can be relatively far away from the factor 
loading concomitant the Bund. These factor loadings are subsequently estimated by 
OLS regression. When performing factor analysis for the rolling windows we thus 
include fewer countries than before so that possible measurement errors in the loadings 
of the excluded countries do not affect the CRF rate. Only the last observation of a 
rolling window is retained. For example, over the first rolling window that begins on 3 
January 2007 and ends on 3 July 2007, the first 124 estimated CRF rates are based on 
the pre-crisis period analysis and only the last CRF estimate of 3 July 2007 is based on 
the first rolling window analysis. 
  243)  To obtain the additive scaling factor  ˆ  of Equation (5) and to estimate the 
relationship between current transaction cost and the liquidity risk premium, OLS is 
applied to Equation (8) over the full sample period in order to exploit the variation in 
the explanatory variable of Equation (8) to a maximum. This regression is based on 
Germany only because during the crisis the Bund has substantially lower credit risk 
than any other bond. By including only the Bund in this regression we limit possible 
distortions to the CRF rate that could arise from empirical differences in the implicit 
credit risk premium on a bond and the implicit credit risk premium on the 
corresponding CDS. In our theoretical model of Section 2 these premiums were 
assumed to be equal for each country. As will be shown below, this is the case for 
Germany, but not for most other countries. 
Figure 5 depicts the evolution of the factor loadings by reference maturity 
obtained with Longitudinal Factor Analysis as developed in Section 3. All loadings are 
scaled by the loading concomitant the Bund. Hence, factor loadings below 1 indicate 
that a bond has a lower sensitivity to the CRF rate than the Bund, while the CRF rate 
has a larger effect on bonds with a higher factor loading. Over the first say 125 
windows (i.e. the last six months of 2007), except for the Irish and EIB factor loadings, 
all scaled factor loadings remain relatively close to their pre-crisis period estimates that 
are not far from unity. It thus seems adequate to assume stable factor loadings and to 
include a maximum of countries when analysing the pre-crisis period. Over this period, 
the factor loading varies between 0.93 (0.97) and 1.09 (1.11) on 5-year (10-year) bonds 
as can be seen from the first observation for each issuer in the figure. The highest 
loading corresponds to the Greek bond. Depending on maturity, the lowest loading 
corresponds to the Austrian or EIB bond. In most cases, the difference with the Bund 
loading is less than 0.03. Since the crisis, however, differences between loadings across 
countries have been much more important. Furthermore, factor loadings have begun to 
vary substantially over time. For example, the factor loading corresponding to the 10-
year Greek bond first fell to zero before reaching a maximum of 2.7. Even for countries 
with factor loadings relatively close to the factor loading on the Bund, such as Belgium, 
France and the Netherlands, factor loadings vary substantially over time. 
  25 





































































































































Notes: Estimates of the parameters of Equation (4) are obtained with LFA as developed in Section 3. 
Factor loadings are scaled by the loading concomitant the Bund. 
 
The average of the factor loadings over the rolling windows and the parameter 
estimates of Equation (8) are shown in Table 2. Note that the cross-sectional 
differences in average factor loadings are broadly the same for 5-year and 10-year 
bonds. Between Feb. 2006 and Feb. 2010 the average CRF rate ( ˆ ) was respectively 
3.32% and 3.71% for 5-year and 10-year bonds, respectively. The coefficient ˆ is 
larger than 1, implying that on average the liquidity risk premium is higher than current 
transaction cost. Depending on maturity, the current liquidity risk premium is about 
1.53 or 1.74 times the current bid-ask spread. 
Figures 6a and 6b compare the CRF rate with the Bund yield during the period 
of analysis. Until the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, thus more than a 
year into the sub-prime mortgage crisis, the CRF rate was almost identical to the Bund 
yield. As will be shown below, between September 2008 and March 2009, default risk, 
and to some extent liquidity risk, rose substantially on euro area sovereign bonds, the 
Bund included. 
 
  26 
Table 2: LFA estimates of the CRF rate parameters (Feb. 2006 – Feb. 2010) 
  Average scaled factor loading over the rolling windows 
  5-year bonds  10- year bonds 
Austria 1.07  1.11 
Belgium 0.94  0.96 
Finland 0.80  0.92 
France 0.96  0.94 
Germany 1.00  1.00 
Greece 0.74  1.02 
Ireland 0.93  1.04 
Italy 1.03  1.08 
Netherlands 0.96  0.97 
Portugal 0.88  0.96 
Spain 0.93  0.98 
EIB 0.72  0.63 
 ˆ   3.32 (0.03)  3.71 (0.02) 
 ˆ   0.33 0.26 
ˆ  1.53 (0.09)  1.74 (0.12) 
T  1050 1009 
Notes: Estimates of the factor loadings are obtained with LFA as developed in Section 3. The standard 
error is within brackets. Factor loadings are scaled by the loading concomitant the Bund.   is the 
average factor loading (before scaling) concomitant the Bund. 
 ˆ
 
































































5-year Common Risk Free rate (in %)
































































10-year Common Risk Free rate (in %)
10-year Bund Spot Yield (in %)
 
Note: Based on the LFA estimates of the factor loadings in Table 2. 
 
On average, the 5-year and 10-year CRF rate fell by 76 and 30 b.p., 
respectively, when the pre-crisis sample period (Feb. 2006 – Jun. 2007) is compared to 
the crisis sample period (Jul. 2007 – Feb. 2010). Clearly, from peak to bottom level (see 
Figure 6a and 6b), the 5-year and 10-year CRF rate fell much more (i.e. by about 300 
and 200 b.p., respectively). Due to the fall in the CRF rate, for many issuers the costs of 
  27borrowing were actually lower than before the crisis despite a substantial increase in 
their risk premiums. 
4.3  The risk premiums 
Next let us show how the risk premiums have behaved in the recent financial crisis. 
Following the procedure developed in Section 2, the estimated Total Risk Premium 
(TRP) is decomposed into a Credit Risk Premium (CRP) and a Liquidity Risk Premium 
(LRP). 
The crisis impact on the CRP and LRP are shown in the next four figures. For 5-
year bonds (compare Figure 7a with Figure 8a) and 10-year bonds (compare Figure 7b 
with Figure 8b), the CRP is the dominant component in the TRP. The 10-year Bund 
CRP rose from an average of less than 5 b.p. before the crisis to about 17 b.p. during 
the crisis. The CRP on Greek 10-year bonds rose from about 30 b.p. to an average of 
140 b.p. The estimated CRP on the 5-year Irish bond was slightly negative over the pre-
crisis period, suggesting that some of the very low Irish bond quotes in the secondary 
market were unreliable indicators of actual pricing conditions. 
The increase in the LRP is relatively small in comparison to the increase in the 
CRP for all bonds. Before the crisis, except for Irish and EIB bonds, there were no 
substantial differences in the LRP across euro area sovereign bonds. In this respect, EIB 
bonds are a class apart as they are often held to maturity. During the crisis, the LRP has 
grown for all issuers but to various degrees. For example, the LRP on the Bund rose on 
average by less than half of a basis point. In other cases, including the EIB, the LRP 
rose sometimes by more than four b.p.. 
4.4  Benchmark status, flight-to-quality/liquidity, and CRP comparison  
4.4.1  Benchmark status 
If, following Dunne et al. (2007), benchmark status is assigned to the bond with the 
lowest idiosyncratic risk (i.e. the standard deviation of the TRP), then the results of 
Table 3 support our choice to take the Bund as the a priori benchmark. French bonds 
have the second lowest idiosyncratic risk, but are about twice as risky as the Bund. 
Greek bonds are the most risky. In addition to the Bund, only French, Dutch and 
Finnish bonds are less risky than EIB bonds. All other euro area sovereign bonds are 
more risky than EIB bonds. 
  28 
Fig. 7a: Average 5-year credit  
risk premium (in b.p.) 
Fig. 7b: Average 10-year credit risk  























































































Feb.2006 - Jun. 2007























































































Feb.2006 - Jun. 2007
Jul. 2007 - Feb 2010
Note: Based on the LFA estimates of the factor loadings in Table 2. No estimate is available for Finland 
over the period Feb. 2006 – Jun. 2007. 
 
 
Fig. 8a: Average 5-year liquidity  
risk premium (in b.p.) 
Fig. 8b: Average 10-year liquidity  
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Feb.2006 - Jun. 2007
Jul. 2007 - Feb 2010
Note: Based on the LFA estimates of the factor loadings in Table 2. 
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Table 3: Standard deviation of the common risk free (CRF) rate, the credit risk 
premium (CRP), the liquidity risk premium (LRP), and the total risk premium 
(TRP), in b.p. 
  5-year bonds  10-year bonds
 
  CRP LRP TRP CRP LRP TRP 
Austria  36.4 4.5 43.8  39.2 2.6 43.8 
Belgium 41.9 1.9 44.5  40.0 1.3 42.2 
Finland  34.0 2.4 35.7  29.8 1.8 31.4 
France  27.4 1.2 29.6  28.4 1.0 29.4 
Germany  17.8 0.4 18.1  14.4 0.3 14.6 
Greece  109.9 2.9 115.2  94.8  3.6 102.2 
Ireland  82.8 4.9 89.2  88.3 4.0 94.8 
Italy  52.6 1.9 52.1  48.6 1.2 50.0 
Netherlands  30.8 1.1 33.3  30.4 0.8 33.0 
Portugal 51.8 3.2 56.7  49.7 2.5 53.8 
Spain  44.3 2.2 47.0  43.7 1.4 45.9 
EIB  35.0 3.5 36.6  36.5 4.3 41.3 
CRF 88.9  53.6 
Notes: Based on the LFA estimates of the factor loadings shown in Table 2. Sample period: Feb. 2006 – 
Feb. 2010. 
 
Dunne et al. (2007) designate, with the exception of very long bonds (i.e. 
maturity exceeds 10 years), French bonds as sovereign benchmarks for the period April 
2003 – March 2005 because bi-lateral inter-bond regressions suggest that French bonds 
have lower variance in the total risk premium than Italian or German bonds. Our 
empirical results are in accordance with this finding for the pre-crisis period up to June 
2007 included, but not thereafter. Moreover, before the crisis, there are other bonds, 
such as Dutch 5-year bonds that are even less risky than French 5-year bonds. Since the 
crisis, however, Bunds have the lowest risk. Benchmark status shows up in crisis 
periods. 
A robustness check is carried out by taking alternatively any other bond as the a 
priori benchmark. The top row of Table 4 indicates the country on which the estimate 
of the benchmark choice parameter   is based. The standard deviation of the TRP for 
each country is shown in the associated column. For all choices, the Bund clearly has 
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Table 4: Standard deviation of the TRP by benchmark choice parameter   
  A priori benchmark  
  AU BE FI  FR GE GR IR  IT  NE PO SP  EIB 
  5-year bonds 
AU  55 33  n.a.  36 44 32 54 45 41 26 35  n.a. 
BE  55 34  n.a.  37 44 33 54 45 41 29 37  n.a. 
FI  45 27  n.a.  31 36 31 45 36 34 22 27  n.a. 
FR  41 19  n.a.  22 30 19 40 31 26 14 22  n.a. 
GE 30  9  n.a.  12 18 11 29 21 15  8  11  n.a. 
GR  126 106 n.a. 109 115  98  124 118 112 100 108 n.a. 
IR  101  78  n.a.  81 89 75 99 91 86 70 81  n.a. 
IT  62 41  n.a.  44 52 40 62 53 49 36 44  n.a. 
NE  44 22  n.a.  26 33 23 44 35 30 17 25  n.a. 
PO  68 47  n.a.  50 57 42 66 59 54 41 49  n.a. 
SP  58 37  n.a.  40 47 33 57 49 44 31 39  n.a. 
EIB  46 26  n.a.  30 37 29 47 37 34 23 28  n.a. 
  AU BE FI  FR GE GR IR  IT  NE PO SP  EIB 
  10-year bonds 
AU  53 36  n.a.  37 44 44 53 46 41 37 39  n.a. 
BE  51 34  n.a.  36 42 43 51 45 39 36 37  n.a. 
FI  42 25  n.a.  26 31 32 42 34 30 24 26  n.a. 
FR  38 22  n.a.  23 29 31 38 32 26 23 25  n.a. 
GE 24  9  n.a.  9  15 17 24 18 12 11 11  n.a. 
GR  111  95  n.a.  96  102 104 111 106 100  98  99  n.a. 
IR  104  87  n.a.  88 95 96  104  98 92 88 90  n.a. 
IT  59 42  n.a.  43 50 51 59 53 47 43 45  n.a. 
NE  42 25  n.a.  26 33 34 42 36 30 26 28  n.a. 
PO  63 47  n.a.  48 54 54 62 57 51 48 49  n.a. 
SP  55 38  n.a.  39 46 47 55 49 43 40 42  n.a. 
EIB  52 32  n.a.  34 41 41 53 43 38 31 34  n.a. 
Notes: Based on the LFA estimates of the factor loadings in shown Table 2. The cell with the lowest 
variance is in bold. Sample period: Feb. 2006 – Feb. 2010. 
 
4.4.2  Flight-to-quality and flight-to-liquidity 
While not contesting that credit risk is more important than liquidity risk for the 
absolute level of the sovereign bond yields in the euro area, Beber et al. (2009) provide 
some evidence for the hypothesis that, in times of market stress, investors chase 
liquidity, and not credit quality. The authors argue that large bond trades are almost 
exclusively driven by liquidity since liquidity has a positive (negative) impact on trade 
inflow (outflow) whereas credit quality has the opposite effect, suggesting a “free-
from” rather than “flight-to” credit quality. Based on pre-crisis data, that study hence 
rejects the flight-to-quality (i.e. credit quality) hypothesis. 
  31For the current crisis, however, based on our estimates of the risk premiums, the 
empirical evidence suggests that neither the flight-to-liquidity nor the flight-to-quality 
hypothesis can be rejected. We expect a significantly larger increase in the transaction 
costs of bonds that are deserted by investors than on save haven bonds. To test this 
hypothesis, we divide our sample of twelve issuers twice in two sub samples. In the 
first comparison, the average liquidity risk of the six issuers with the lowest liquidity 
risk is compared with the six issuers with the highest liquidity risk. In the second 
comparison, the average liquidity risk of the six issuers with the lowest credit risk is 
compared with the liquidity risk of the six issuers with the highest credit risk. The two 
comparisons are different because half of the issuers of the sample with lowest liquidity 
risk issuers are different from the sample with lowest credit risk issuers (see the notes 
of Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Average change in the liquidity risk premium during the recent financial 
crisis, by risk category (in b.p.) 





































































Notes: Based on the LFA estimates of the factor loadings in shown Table 2. The standard error is within 
brackets. In the case of 5-year bonds, sovereign bonds of Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Spain have the lowest liquidity risk whereas sovereign bonds of Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands have the lowest credit risk over the period between Feb. 
2010 and Jun. 2007. In the case of 10-year bonds, sovereign bonds of Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, and Italy bonds have the lowest liquidity risk whereas sovereign bonds of Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain have the lowest credit risk over the period between 
Feb. 2010 and Jun. 2007. 
 
For both comparisons we find that liquidity risk increases faster for the group 
with the highest risk, were it liquidity risk or credit risk, suggesting that investors chase 
both liquidity and credit quality. The LRP of initially low liquidity risk issuers 
increased on average from 0.60 b.p. (0.47 b.p.) to 2.86 b.p. (2.10 b.p.) on 5-year (10-
year) bonds (see Table 5). The LRP of initially low credit risk issuers increased on 
average from 0.98 b.p. (0.56 b.p.) to 3.03 b.p. (2.35 b.p.) on 5-year (10-year) bonds. 
  32The LRP thus increased by about 2 b.p. for low liquidity and low credit risk issuers. For 
high liquidity and high credit risk issuers this increase was slightly above 3 b.p.. Hence, 
both high liquidity risk bonds and high credit risk bonds have become less attractive in 
comparison to low liquidity and low credit risk bonds respectively. 
Let’s next compare the order of the countries when sorted on the credit risk 
premium with the order of the countries when sorted on the liquidity risk premium 
during the crisis (see Figures 7a-7b and Figures 8a-8b respectively). While the cross-
sectional relationship between the liquidity risk premium and credit risk premium is not 
one-to-one, countries with lower liquidity risk tend to have lower credit risk. For 
example, Dutch, French, and German bonds have both the lowest liquidity and credit 
risk. On the other side, both liquidity and credit risk are relatively high on Irish and 
Greek bonds. EIB bonds are rather exceptional in the sense that they have the highest 
liquidity risk but, at the same time, are among the group of lowest credit risk issuers. 
The interaction between liquidity and credit risk was the topic of a recent study 
by Favero et al. (2010). The main idea brought forward by this work is that the demand 
for liquidity responds both to the magnitude of trading costs and to the availability of 
outside investment opportunities. It is assumed that investors are less likely to sell 
securities when outside investment opportunities are less attractive, a situation that is 
assumed to coincide with increased aggregate risk. Therefore, although high liquidity is 
positively valued by investors, they value it less when risk is high. Some empirical 
evidence in support of this new hypothesis is found for the pre-crisis years 2002 and 
2003. 
Our crisis sample results contrast with these predictions as, in addition to a 
positive cross-sectional relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk, we also find 
a strong positive relationship between the two risk components over time. The 
correlation coefficient is higher than 0.5 for most bonds (see Table 6). Liquidity is thus 
more valued when risk is high. During the recent crisis, higher aggregate risk reduced 
the value of new investment opportunities, which in turn led to lower credit demand 
and a lower CRF rate. As a result, the correlation between, on the one hand, the CRF 
rate, and, on the other hand, the liquidity risk or credit risk premium, was significantly 
negative. A full analysis of the drivers of liquidity risk premiums is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
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Table 6: Correlations between the credit risk premium (CRP), the liquidity risk 
premium (LRP) and the common risk free (CRF) rate 














Austria  -0.84 -0.83 0.81 -0.81 -0.76 0.77 
Belgium  -0.81 -0.82 0.83 -0.78 -0.80 0.89 
Finland  -0.69 -0.84 0.43 -0.82 -0.78 0.58 
France  -0.86 -0.81 0.85 -0.82 -0.74 0.87 
Germany -0.91 -0.73 0.71 -0.85 -0.65 0.68 
Greece  -0.85 -0.81 0.78 -0.85 -0.63 0.74 
Ireland  -0.88 -0.89 0.88 -0.83 -0.80 0.90 
Italy  -0.83 -0.84 0.73 -0.87 -0.88 0.89 
Netherlands  -0.86 -0.85 0.89 -0.81 -0.75 0.88 
Portugal  -0.85 -0.76 0.67 -0.81 -0.72 0.76 
Spain  -0.85 -0.85 0.79 -0.82 -0.79 0.90 
EIB  -0.78 -0.36 0.08 -0.89 -0.35 0.46 
Average  -0.83 -0.78 0.71 -0.83 -0.72 0.78 




4.4.3  Comparing the bond credit risk premium with the CDS credit risk premium 
Finally, we analyse whether or not the price of credit risk is the same in the bond and 
the corresponding derivative market. In efficient markets, the exploitation of arbitrage 
opportunities would lead to a convergence of prices. One may therefore expect that the 
bond credit risk premium is on average equal to the CDS implied credit risk premium. 
The latter premium is computed by subtracting the CDS liquidity premium from the 
CDS rate. Figures 9a and 9b show that, during the crisis, the bond credit risk premium 
is substantially higher than the CDS implied credit risk premium for most of the bonds 
(no data is available on the transaction cost of the EIB CDSs). For example, the 
difference exceeds 25 b.p. for Finnish and Greek bonds between Jul. 2007 and Feb. 
2010. Before the crisis, the 5-year bond CRP was broadly in line with the 
corresponding CDS CRP. The CRP on some of the 10-year bonds however was 
substantially above the corresponding CDS CRP. Over the full period of analysis, the 
price of sovereign credit risk is about the same (i.e. the difference is 5 b.p. or less) in 
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Fig. 9a: Average 5-year bond CRP  
minus CDS CRP (in b.p.) 
Fig. 9b: Average 10-year bond CRP  
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Jul. 2007 - Feb. 2010
Notes: Based on the LFA-estimates of the factor loadings shown in Table 2. 
 
These results imply that 1) if the CDS implied credit risk premium is in line 
with the fundamentals, then many euro area sovereign bonds were under-priced during 
the crisis, and, thus, borrowing costs were higher than warranted on the basis of true 
creditworthiness; 2) if the bond price is in line with the fundamentals, then many CDS 
were under-priced, and, thus, the cost of insurance against default was lower than 
warranted on the basis of true creditworthiness; or a combination of both 1) and 2). It is 
also possible that discrepancies between quotes and actual transaction prices were more 
important in one market than the other. 
5  Conclusion 
We introduce Longitudinal Factor Analysis to extract the common risk free rate from a 
sample of sovereign bonds of countries in a monetary union. Cross-variable restrictions 
are derived that are ignored by classical factor analysis. Since LFA exploits the 
typically very large longitudinal dimension of bond data, it performs better than 
traditional methods. A Monte Carlo experiment shows that substantial efficiency gains 
can be made in the estimation of idiosyncratic risk and factor loadings. The factor 
loading concomitant the benchmark security is required to determine the volatility of 
the CRF rate. Its level is determined by an auxiliary regression. 
  35The bond yield decomposition procedure proposed in this paper sheds new light 
on some key issues in the euro area sovereign bond markets such as benchmark status, 
flight-to-liquidity and flight-to-quality hypotheses, and price differences between the 
bond and derivative markets. First, our empirical findings suggest that since the 2007 
financial crisis the German Bund has the lowest idiosyncratic risk, and hence 
benchmark status. The fact that the German bund did not have the lowest idiosyncratic 
risk before the crisis confirms the findings of Dunne et al. (2007). Second, in contrast 
with Beber et al. (2009), who interpret a negative relationship between credit quality 
and trade inflow as a sign that investors are less concerned by credit quality than 
liquidity, our results suggest that investors chase both credit quality and liquidity in 
episodes of market stress. The liquidity risk premium increased more for both ex ante 
high liquidity risk and high credit risk issuers than for ex ante low liquidity risk and low 
credit risk issuers. Third, in contrast with the prediction of the Favero et al. (2010) 
model, liquidity is more valued when aggregate risk is high as, in addition to a positive 
cross-sectional relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk, we also find a strong 
positive relationship between the two risk components over time. Finally, given the cost 
of insurance against default, many euro area sovereign bonds seem under-priced in the 
recent financial turmoil. 
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  38Appendix I: The likelihood function 
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and variance: 







-1.         ( 2 0 )  
The value of the integral is thus (2π)
1/2 divided by the standard deviation of Zt. The total 




















































































































          ( 2 1 )  
If we would allow the implied variability of the exogenous process to vary, we should 
correct the likelihood for this (this is similar to a uniformly distributed random variable 
on a certain interval: the higher its variability, the longer the interval and the lower the 
density). We avoid this correction by using a standardization that keeps the variability 
of the exogenous process constant. 
To obtain the maximizing values for ai we set the respective derivative of the 
likelihood function equal to 0 which yields: 














































































































.    (23) 
In other words,   i i it t b a x E / ) (   is a weighted average of the likewise terms for bonds j 
and k. Taking the derivatives to aj and to ak similarly gives that each term is a weighted 
average of the two other terms. But then all terms have to be identical as claimed in 
Equation (15). 
  40Appendix II: Monte Carlo results 
 
Table 7: Average factor loadings and average variances 
 True  value  PC  EM  LFA 
  Factor loadings  12 ...., , 1 ,  i bi  
Bond  1  1.000 0.986 0.996 0.999 
Bond  2  1.100 1.087 1.098 1.099 
Bond  3  1.200 1.188 1.199 1.198 
Bond  4  1.300 1.291 1.300 1.298 
Bond  5  1.400 1.395 1.401 1.398 
Bond  6  1.500 1.501 1.502 1.498 
Bond  7  1.600 1.609 1.604 1.598 
Bond  8  1.700 1.719 1.705 1.698 
Bond  9  1.800 1.831 1.806 1.798 
Bond  10 1.900 1.947 1.908 1.898 
Bond  11 2.000 2.066 2.011 1.998 
Bond  12 2.100 2.187 2.113 2.098 
  Variance of the errors,    12 ..., , 1 ,
2  i si
Bond  1  0.040 0.067 0.050 0.040 
Bond  2  0.090 0.119 0.097 0.090 
Bond  3  0.160 0.188 0.164 0.160 
Bond  4  0.250 0.273 0.252 0.250 
Bond  5  0.360 0.373 0.359 0.360 
Bond  6  0.490 0.486 0.485 0.489 
Bond  7  0.640 0.610 0.632 0.639 
Bond  8  0.810 0.743 0.796 0.809 
Bond  9  1.000 0.883 0.980 0.999 
Bond  10 1.210 1.027 1.182 1.208 
Bond  11 1.440 1.172 1.402 1.439 
Bond  12 1.690 1.314 1.639 1.688 
Notes: Averages are computed over ten thousand replications. For each replication twelve bond yield 
series with one thousand observations each are generated as follows:   
,  , 
, it t i it e Z b x  
10 / ) 1 ( 1    i bi
2 2 ) 10 / ) 1 ( 2 . 0 (    i si }. 12 ,..., 1 {  i    is drawn from a standard normal 
distribution.   is drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance equal to   The 
Principal Components (PC) results in the middle column are obtained with Theil’s (1971) method. 
Classical factor analysis results are obtained with the EM algorithm of Rubin and Thayer (1982). The 





  41Appendix III: Construction of constant maturity bond yields 
 
Constant 5-year and 10-year maturity bond spot yields are derived from linear inter- 
and extrapolation of secondary market plain vanilla bond quotes on Bloomberg. We 
first interpolate the z-spreads reported on Bloomberg, and then add the interpolated z-
spread to the swap spot rates in order to compute the bond spot rate with exact maturity 
 For example, the z-spread for maturity  concomitant country   in period t is 
estimated by: 
. m m i
, ) 1 (
2 1 , , , m it m it m it z w z w z            ( 2 4 )    
where w is the weight on the z-spread  concomitant country  ’s bond with maturity 
 and   is the weight on the z-spread  concomitant country  ’s bond with 
maturity  ;
1 ,m it z i
, 1 m ) 1 ( w 
2 m
2 ,m it z i
) ( ) ( 1 2 2 m m m m w    ;  }. 10 , 5 {  m  Since we restrict our analysis to two 
benchmark maturities only, full yield curve modelling with a priori chosen functional 
forms as in Nelson and Siegel (1987) is not necessarily best. Measurement errors (in the 
z-spreads   and  ) may be less distorting in the latter approach, but our 
approach is less restrictive concerning the curvature of the yield curve around the 
benchmark maturities, and thus potentially better in estimating the benchmark maturity 
spot rates. 
1 ,m it z
2 ,m it z
Preferably, the on-the-run bond is used when inter- and extrapolating. For a 
bond to be considered an on-the-run bond in period t its remaining time to maturity 
must be closer to m ears than any other bond and its original maturity should be in the 
reference interval(m
y
) , m m m     . The values  5 1    and  10 2    are used, i.e. for a 
bond to be considered an on-the-run 5-year bond it must expire within four to six years 
(i.e. not before  4 * t  and not after  6 * t ) after the issuance date     *). (t
In addition, the following selection criteria are applied: 
1) If the on-the-run bond exists, the closest bond to the reference maturity at the 
opposite side of the on-the-run bond is chosen, and we interpolate. If the latter is not 
available, then the closest bond at the side of the on-the-run bond is chosen, and we 
extrapolate. 
2) If in period t there is no on-the-run bond then the two bonds closest to the reference 
maturity at opposite sides are chosen, and we interpolate. If one side is not available, 
the two closest bonds at one side are chosen, and we extrapolate. 
  423) Only long-term fixed rate bonds are included. The original maturity of the selected 
bonds exceeds four years. 
4) French, German and Italian bonds are only selected when they have a minimum size 
of € 1 billion. For all other countries and the European Investment Bank the minimum 
size is € 500 million. 
5) Yields of bonds are excluded during their last year (i.e. short-term instruments are 
excluded). Also, days during the first month are excluded if the bid-ask spread on the 
yield to maturity is larger than 15 b.p..  
6) Only plain vanilla fixed coupon bonds are selected. All securities with option-like 
features, including callable bonds, are excluded. 
7) Outliers are removed.
9 
 
                                                 
9 Four outlier bonds (i.e. two Irish bonds, one issued on 4/11/1986 and one issued on 18/8/1994, and two 
EIB bonds, one issued on 20/2/1997 and one issued on 16/2/1998), two outlier yields on the included 
EIB bond issued on 6/4/2006, and all bond yields on 17/4/2006, 19/6/2006 and 21/03/2008 have been 
removed. 
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics of the bond data (Feb. 2006 – Feb. 2010) 
5-year bonds 
 
Number of bonds 




(in € bn) 
   Min Max  Min  Avg  Max 
Austria 7  5.8  15.0  1.3  7.6  12.2 
Belgium 9 5.9  20.0  7.5  11.0  15.8 
Finland 6  5.3  11.2  5.0  5.7  6.5 
France 19  5.0  25.8  3.4  15.3  20.0 
Germany 20 5.0  10.2  7.0  19.7  27.0 
Greece 13  5.2  15.0  2.5  7.4  12.5 
Ireland 5  5.0  16.9  5.8  6.5  8.2 
Italy 15  4.9  10.6  4.0  18.6  28.3 
Netherlands 7  5.5  10.5  8.0  12.1  15.5 
Portugal 8  5.4  15.3  4.3  5.8  7.1 
Spain 13  5.3  15.6  1.3  11.2  15.8 
EIB 8  5.0  10.4  0.5  5.0  9.8 
Number of observations per issuer  1058 
10-year bonds 
 
Number of bonds 
used in the estimation 
Original maturity  
(in years) 
Size 
(in € bn) 
   Min Max  Min  Avg  Max 
Austria 9  10.0  15.5  1.3  8.1  12.2 
Belgium 8  10.2  19.7  4.0  8.6  12.2 
Finland 6  11.0  15.7  3.0  5.0  6.5 
France 13  10.0  30.7  5.4  16.6  22.0 
Germany 13 10.1  30.0  3.8  17.6  24.0 
Greece 9  10.2  20.5  4.6  9.0  15.5 
Ireland 7  10.3  16.9  5.0  6.5  8.2 
Italy 15  10.1  15.9  5.0  20.0  25.2 
Netherlands 10  10.0  30.0  6.4  10.5  15.5 
Portugal 8  10.2  16.1  3.0  5.6  6.9 
Spain 11  10.3  31.0  3.0  11.0  15.0 
EIB 6  10.0  15.8  3.3  5.0  7.0 
Number of observations per issuer  1058 




  44Table 9: Descriptive statistics of bond spot yields (in %, Feb. 2006 – Feb. 2010) 
5-year bonds 
   Min  Avg  Median  Max  St dev 
Austria 2.41  3.67  3.72  4.87  0.55 
Belgium 2.46  3.69  3.74  4.96  0.58 
Finland 2.28  3.60  3.71  4.87  0.62 
France 2.32  3.57  3.71  4.88  0.65 
Germany 2.14  3.44  3.67  4.74  0.73 
Greece 3.31  4.28  4.18  6.97  0.60 
Ireland 3.10  3.97  3.93  5.20  0.41 
Italy 2.77  3.86  3.90  5.14  0.54 
Netherlands 2.31  3.58  3.71  4.87  0.62 
Portugal 2.78  3.82  3.85  4.98  0.48 
Spain 2.68  3.70  3.74  4.90  0.54 
EIB 2.52  3.76  3.82  5.04  0.61 
T  1058 
10-year bonds 
   Min  Avg  Median  Max  St dev 
Austria 3.46  4.14  4.14  4.88  0.30 
Belgium 3.48  4.17  4.13  4.99  0.32 
Finland 3.42  4.06  4.03  4.86  0.32 
France 3.47  4.04  4.02  4.85  0.34 
Germany 2.97  3.86  3.93  4.69  0.41 
Greece 3.71  4.78  4.65  7.31  0.63 
Ireland 3.45  4.53  4.47  6.17  0.57 
Italy 3.71  4.42  4.42  5.32  0.30 
Netherlands 3.45  4.06  4.04  4.85  0.32 
Portugal 3.57  4.34  4.35  5.08  0.32 
Spain 3.47  4.19  4.15  4.94  0.29 
EIB 3.54  4.21  4.19  5.01  0.33 
T  1058 
Source: Own calculations based on Bloomberg. 
 
  45Table 10: Descriptive statistics of CDS spreads (in b.p., Feb. 2006 – Feb. 2010) 
5-year CDS 
   Min  Avg  Median  Max  St dev  T 
Austria 0.5  39.2  7.7  273.0  55.2  1057 
Belgium 1.0  28.0  17.2  157.8  33.5  1057 
Finland 6.5  32.2  27.9  93.9  20.0 470 
France 0.5  18.2  8.8  97.7  21.4  1057 
Germany 0.6 15.5  5.8 91.9 18.9  1057 
Greece 4.4  80.5  37.4  428.3  95.3  1057 
Ireland 1.5  72.1  20.8  395.8  91.4  1057 
Italy 5.3  50.9  28.5  200.6  52.1  1057 
Netherlands 1.0  21.8  8.2  131.0  29.4  1053 
Portugal 3.4  41.2  27.6  244.4  43.3 1057 
Spain 1.8  42.3  26.8  173.4  44.7  1054 
EIB 2.5  21.4  7.8  68.0  18.3  592 
10-year CDS 
   Min  Avg  Median  Max  St dev  T 
Austria 0.8  41.2  12.0  260.1  53.6  1057 
Belgium 2.4  31.4  23.3  152.9  33.1  1057 
Finland 11.0  35.6  32.8  94.2  19.1  470 
France 1.4  20.9  13.0  96.6  21.6  1048 
Germany 0.7 17.7  9.0 90.7 18.9  1048 
Greece 10.8  87.0  47.2  379.9  87.0 1057 
Ireland 2.3  73.5  26.8  365.0  87.2  1057 
Italy 11.4  58.8  38.5  205.3  48.5  1057 
Netherlands 1.8  24.9  12.3  126.3  29.6  1018 
Portugal 7.2  46.7  36.8  227.1  40.7 1057 
Spain 4.4  46.8  35.3  169.0  43.7  1057 
EIB 3.5  24.3  14.0  78.0  19.8  481 
Source: Own calculations based on sovereign and EIB CDS spreads from Credit Market Analysis 
Limited and Markit respectively. 
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Table 11: Average bond and CDS transaction costs (in b.p.) 
5-year bond and CDS 
  Feb. 2006 – Jun. 2007  Jul. 2007 – Feb. 2010 
   Bond  CDS  CDS - Bond  Bond  CDS  CDS – Bond 
Austria 0.4  1.5  1.1 3.4  4.7  1.3 
Belgium 0.4  1.4  1.0  2.0 4.6  2.6 
Finland 0.4  n.a. n.a. 2.2  5.3  3.1 
France 0.4  1.3 0.9 1.4  3.5  2.1 
Germany 0.3 1.3  1.0  0.6  3.1  2.5 
Greece 0.4  1.5 1.1 2.7  7.0  4.3 
Ireland 1.8  2.3 0.5 4.5  6.9  2.5 
Italy 0.4  1.2  0.8  1.7  4.2  2.5 
Netherlands 0.4  1.6  1.2  1.3  4.8  3.4 
Portugal 0.5  1.5  1.0  2.5 4.4  1.8 
Spain 0.4  2.2  1.8  2.1  4.2 2.1 
EIB 1.7  n.a.  n.a.  4.5  n.a.  n.a. 
Average 0.6  1.6  1.0  2.4 4.8  2.6 
T  357 678 
10-year bond and CDS 
  Feb. 2006 – Jun. 2007  Jul. 2007 – Feb. 2010 
  Bond  CDS  CDS - Bond  Bond  CDS  CDS - Bond 
Austria 0.4  1.9  1.5 2.0  4.9  2.9 
Belgium 0.3  2.9  2.6  1.2  4.6  3.4 
Finland 0.3  n.a. n.a. 1.5 5.4  3.9 
France 0.2  2.9 2.6 1.0  3.5  2.5 
Germany 0.2 2.3  2.0  0.4  3.0  2.6 
Greece 0.3  3.9 3.6 2.1  7.3  5.3 
Ireland 0.5  2.3 1.8 3.0  7.2  4.2 
Italy 0.3  3.9  3.6  1.1  4.4  3.3 
Netherlands 0.3  1.3  1.0  0.9  4.8  3.9 
Portugal 0.4  3.2  2.9  1.9  4.4  2.6 
Spain 0.3  1.2  0.9  1.3  4.3 3.0 
EIB 1.2  n.a.  n.a.  4.8  n.a.  n.a. 
Average 0.4  2.6  2.2  1.8  4.9  3.4 
T  357 678 
Source: Own calculations based on sovereign bond and CDS quotes from Bloomberg (price provider = 
bond trader composite) and Credit Market Analysis Limited respectively.  
Note: The transaction cost is measured by the difference in the bid and the ask rate. 
 